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J Uc'rlCJ<] BLACKM UN, dissenting. 
I !Uust dissent for the reasons stated in my respective writ-
ings in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 17 (1977), 
ami Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 768 (HJ79). I also 
agree with much of what JusTICE REHNQUH:>T says, post, at 
5-10, in his dissenting opinion in the 11resent case. The an-
ticipated confusion tJ2.at~ChQdwick an cJ_Sanders si'awnei for 
tfie' ftat H)n'S £ri8J" andapPeftate COUrtSfs" well illustrated by 
the Court's listing, ante, at 5, of cases c.lecideu Ly federal 
courts of ap Is since Chadwick was announced i n 1 ~77. 
The Court's ecision m t e present case at least has the 
merit of a "bright line" rule that should serve to eliminate 
the opaqueness and to dissipate some of the confusioll. See 
442 U. S., at 771-772. NoHetheless, under today's holding, 
an arresting officer will still be forced. despite a concededly 
lawful search of the automobile, to go to the magistrate, 
whether near or far. for the search wa.rrant inevitably to be 
issued when the facts are like those presented here. And 
only time will tell whether the Court's "test," ante, at o- 7, for 
determining whether a package's exterior "announce lsJ its 
contents" will lead to a new stream of litigation. 
I continue to think the Court is in error and that it would 
have been better, see 442 U. S., at 772. "to adopt a clear-cut 
rule to the effect that a warrant should not be required to 
seize aud search any personal property found in au automo-
/ 
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bile that may in turn be seized and searched without a war~. 
rant pursuant to Carroll [v. United States, 267 U. S. 132' 
(1925) ,] and Chambers [v. Marone.y, 399 U.S. 42 (1970)] .. " 
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Dear Potter: 
I contemplate joining but with a few 
"observations." 
Justice Stewart 
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Dear Potter , 
Please join me . 
Sincerely yours , 
--
Justice Stewart 
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Dear Potter: 
I join your opinion in this case. I will add the following 
concurring statement. 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, concurring : I join Justice Stewart 's 
opinion for the Court. I write separately simply to underscore 
the fact that our earlier decisions in United States v Chadwick, 
433 U.S. 1, and Arkansas v Sanders, 442 u.s. 753, were not 
decided under the "automob ile exception". 
Justice Stewart accurately notes, ante at 3-4, that in both 
Chadwick and Sanders, it uas argued by the prosecution that the 
"automobile exception" somehow justified a warrantless search 
of the containers involve d in those two cases. And he also 
!
notes that in both cases this Court rejected the suggestion. 
In doing so, the Court emphasized that the mere happenstance 
that an automobile was mentioned in the fact pattern of the 
cases was irrelevant. 
Chadwick turned on the legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the contents of a footlocker shipped on an interstate common 
carrier and signalled by two padlocks securing the container. 
The Court explicitly noted that the case was not an "automobile 
exception" case: the presence 0f the taxi was purely a 
coincidence and had no bearing on the holding. 433 U.S. at 
11-12. The taxi entered the picture only because the agents 
deferred making the arrest until Chadwick exercised dominion 
over the footlocker by helping to lift it into the trunk of the 
J 
cab. The situation would have been no different for probable 
cause analysis if Chadwick had undertaken to carry the 
footlocker to some distant point without a vehicle. 
In Sanders too, it was the luggage being transported by 
Sanders at the time of his arrest, not the automobile in which 
it was carried, that was the focus of the Court's inquiry and 
holding. Once again, the Court's opinion stressed that "the 
extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers and 
other parcels depends not at all upon whether they are seized 
from an automobile." 442 U:s-=-at 765 n.l3. (emphasis added). 
Justice Stewar t 
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wusly stated why I believe the so-called "ex-
clusionary rule" created by this Court imposes a burden out 
of all proportion to the Fourth Amendment values which it 
seeks to advance by seriously impeding the efforts of the 
national, state, and local governments to apprehend and con-
vict those who have violated their laws. See California v. 
Minjares, 443 U. S. 916 (1979) (REHNQUIST, J. , joined by 
BuRGER, C. J. , dissenting from the denial of a stay). I have 
in no way abandoned those views, but believe that the Court's 
opinion in the present case compounds the evils of the "ex-
clusionary rule" by engrafting subtleties into the jurisprud-
ence of the Fourth Amendment itself that are neither required 
nor desirable under our previous decisions. As Justice Harlan 
stated in his concurring opinion in Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U. S. 443, 490-491 (1971): 
"State and federal law enforcement officers and pros-
ecutorial authorities must find quite intolerable the 
present state of uncertainty, which extends even to such 
an every day question as the circumstances under which 
police may enter a man's property to arrest him and seize 
a vehicle believed to have been used during the com-
mission of s crime. 
"I would begin r the l process of re-evaluation bv over-
ruling Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), and Ker v. 
California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963) .. . • 
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uuntil we face up to the basic constitutional mistake~ 
of Mapp and Ker, no solid progress in setting things 
straight in search and eeizure law will, in my opinion, 
occur." 
The 10 years which have intervened since Justice Harlan 
made this statement have only tended to confirm its correct-:_ 
ness. 
The harm caused by the exclusionary rule is compounded 
by the judicially-created preference for a warrant as indicating 
satisfaction of the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment. It is often forgotten that nothing in the Fourth 
Amendment itself requires that searches be conducted pm-
suant to warrants. The terms of the amendment simply 
mandate that the people be secure from unreasonable searches 
and seizures, and that any warrants which may issue shall 
only issue upon probable cause: 11The right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses. papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and 
no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause. supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the plac, 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 
Not only has historical study 11suggested that in empha-
sizing the warrant requirement over the reasonableness of 
the search the Court has 'stood the fourth amendment on its 
hea.d' from a hiEtorical standpoint." Coolidge. supra, at 492 
(Harlan. J., concurring) ( quotinp; T. Taylor. Two Studies in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 23-24 (1969)), but the Court 
has failed to appreciate the impact of its decisions. not man-
dated by the Fourth Amendment. on law enforcement. 
Courts. including this Court, often make the rather casual as-
sumption that police are not substantially frustrated in their 
efforts to apprehend those whom they have probable cause 
to arrest or to gather evidence of crime when they have 
probable cause to search by the judicially-created preference 
for a warrant, apparently assuming that the typical case it:! 
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ene in which an officer can make a quick half mile ride to the 
nearest precinct station in an urban area to obtain such a 
warrant. See, e. g., Steagald v. United States, No. 79-6777 
(April 21, 1981), slip op., at 17. But this casual assumption 
simply does not fit the realities of sparsely populated "cow 
counties" located in some of the southern and western states, 
where at least apocryphally the number of cows exceed the 
number of people, and the number of square miles in the 
eounty may exceed 10,000 and the nearest magistrate may be 
25 or even 50 miles away. The great virtue of the opinion in 
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), was that it made allow-
ance for these vast diversities between States; unfortunately 
such an approach to the Fourth Amendment in the true spirit 
of federalism was, as Justice Harlan observed, rejected in 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961). 
Recent developments have cast further doubt on the em-. 
phasis on a warrant as opposed to the reasonableness of the 
search. In Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972), 
the Court ruled that clerks of the municipal court of the city 
of Tampa, Fla., not trained in the law, are "neutral and 
detached magistrates" who may issue warrants which satisfy 
the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. And in 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the Court held that 
a defendant can go behind a warrant and attack its validity 
on a motion to suppress. In emphasizing the warrant re-
quirement the Court has therefore not only erected an edifice 
without solid foundation but also one with little substance. 
Even aside from these general observations on the warrant 
requirement, the case we decide today falls within what has 
been and should continue to be an exception to that require-
ment-the automobile exception. In Cady v. Dombrowski, 
413 U. S. 433, 439 (1973), we explained that one class of 
cases which constitutes "at least a partial exception to this 
general rule [of requiring a warrant] is automobile searches. 
Although vehicles are 'effects' within the meaning of the-
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Fourth Amendment, 'for the purposes of the Fourth Amend .. 
ment there is a constitutional difference between houses and 
cars.' Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 52 (1970). See 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-154 (1925)." We 
also stated in Cady: 
"[T]he application of Fourth Amendment standards, 
originally intended to restrict only the Federal Govern-
ment, to the States presents some difficulty when searches 
of automobiles are involved. The contact with vehicles 
by federal law enforcement officers usually, if not always, 
involves the detection or investigation of crimes unrelated 
to the operation of a vehicle. Cases such as Carroll v. 
United States, supra, and Brinegar v. United States, 338 
U.S. 160 (1949) , illustrate the typical situations in which 
federal officials come into contact with and search vehi-
cles. In both caees, members of a special federal unit 
charged with enforcing a particular federal criminal stat-
ute stopped and searched a vehicle when they had prob-
able cause to believe that the operator was violating that 
statute. 
"As a result of our federal system of government, how .. 
ever, state and local police officers, unlike federal officers, 
have much more contact with vehicles for reasons re-
lated to the operation of vehicles themselves. All States 
require vehicles to be registered and operators to be 
licenPed. States and localities have enacted extensive 
and detailed codes regulating the condition and manner 
in which motor vehicles may be operated on public 
streets and highways." Id., at 440-441. 
I would not draw from the language of either Cady or of 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976), the con-
clusion which the Court draws today that "'inherent mobility' 
cannot alone justify the automobile exception, since the Court 
has sometimes approved warrantless searches in which the 
automobile's mobility was irrelevant." Ante, pp. 3-4. Logi .. 
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~ally, it seems to me that the conclusion to be drawn from 
Cady and Opperman is that one need not demonstrate that 
a particular automobile was capable of being moved, but that 
automobiles as a class are inherently mobile, and a defendant 
seeking to suppress evidence obtained from an automobile 
should not be heard to say that this particular automobile 
had broken down, was in a parking lot under the supervision 
of the police, or the like. Thus, I continue to adhere to the 
:view expressed by JusTICE BLACKMUN that: 
"If 'contraband goods concealed and illegally trans-
ported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched 
for without a warrant,' Carroll v. United States , 267 U. S. 
132, 153 (1925) , then, in my view, luggage and similar 
containers found in an automobile may be searched for 
contraband without a warrant. The luggage, like the 
automobile transporting it, is mobile. And the expecta-
tion of privacy in a suitcase found in the car is probably 
not significantly greater than the expectation of privacy 
in a locked glove compartment. 
"In my view, it would be better to adopt a clear-cut 
rule to the effect that a warrant should not be required 
to seize and search any personal property found in an 
automobile that may in turn be seized and searched 
without a warrant pursuant to Carroll and Chambers." 
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 769, 772 (1979) 
(BLACKMUN, J. , dissenting). 
The proper application of the automobile exception would 
uphold the search conducted by the California Highway 
Patrol officers in this case inasmuch as the Court acknowledges 
that the officers could constitutionally open the tailgate of the 
stationwagon and then open the car's luggage compartment. 
Ante, p. 8. 
The Court, however, concludes that the opening of the two-
plastic garbage bags. which the officers found in the luggage 
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compartment is unconstitutional. In so doing, the Court 
relies on its earlier decision in Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, and 
rejects the argument that the search of the garbage bags 
should, at a minimum, fall within the exception noted in f.Q9t-
note 13 of the Sanders opinion. · There, the Court had 
exPlained: 
"Not all containers and packages found by police during 
the course of a search will deserve the full protection of 
the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for ex-
ample a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very 
nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of 
privacy because their contents can be inferred from their 
outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the con-
tents of a package will be open to 'plain view,' thereby 
obviating the need for a warrant. See Harris v. United 
States, 390 U. S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam)." 442 
U. S., at 764-765, n. 13. 
It seems to me that the search conducted by the Highway I 
Patrol Officers falls squarely within the above exception. 
This is revealed by an examination of the events which 
prompted the search of the luggage compartment in the first 
place-events which are conspiciously absent from the recita-
tion of the facts in the Court's opinion. Prior to opening 
the tailgate of the car, the Highway Patrol Officers had 
already discovered marihuana in the passenger compartment 
of the car. While the officers were rett'ieving this marihuana 
and other drug paraphernalia from the front of the car, peti-
tioner stated: "What you are looking for is in the back.11 
Only then did an officer open the luggage compartment of the 
station wagon and discover the two plastic garbage bags being 
used to wrap the blocks of marihuana. One of the officers 
then testified that he was aware that contraband was often 
wrapped in this fashion-a fact of which all those who watch 
the evening news are surely well aware. Given these factors, 
particuiariy the petitioner's statement, it seems to me that 
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t<>etitioner could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the contents of the garbage bags. Surely, given all the cir~ 
cumstances, the contents of the garbage bags "could be in-
ferred from their outward appearance." 
The present case aptly illustrates the problems inherent in 
the Fourth Amendment analysis adopted by the Court in the 
past two decades. Rather than apply the automobile excep-
tion to a situation such as the present one, the Court in 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977) and Sanders, 
supra, attempted to limit that exception so as not to include 
certain, but not all, containers found within an automobile. 
Apparently, the Court today decides that distinguishing be-
tween containers found in a car is to difficult a task and 
accordingly denudes the language found in footnote 13 of 
Sanders of most of its meaning. It does so evidently in search 
of a workable rule to govern automobile searches. I seek 
such a workable rule as well, but unlike the Court I feel 
that such a rule cannot be found as long as the Court con-
tinues in the direction which it is headed. Instead, I would 
return to the rationale of Carroll and Chambers and hold 
that a warrant should not be required to seize and search any 
personal property found in an automobile that may in turn be 
constitutionally seized and searched without a warraut. I 
would not abandon this reasonably "bright line" in search of 
another. 
But I think that probably any search for "bright lines, 
short of overruling Mapp v. Ohio is apt to be illusory. Our 
entire profession is trained to attack "bright lines" the way 
hounds attack foxes. Acceptance by the courts of arJ;?:uments 
that one thing is the "functional equivalent" of the other, for 
example, soon breaks down what might have been a bright 
line into a blurry impressionistic pattern. 
If city clerks who are not trained in the law satisfy the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, and if a defendant may attack the validity of a war-
rant on a motion to suppress, it seems to me that little is lost 
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in the way of the "core values'' of the Fourth Amendment as 
made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth if M app v. 
Ohio is overruled. This will not establish a bright line except 
to the extent that it makes clear that the t>xclusionary rule is 
not applicable to the states. And it will leave to the federal 
government, with its generally more highly trained law en-
forcement personnel, the problems of wrestling with this 
Court's twisting and turning as it makes decisional law apply-
ing the Fourth Amendment, rather than forcing the 50 States, 
with their widely varying conditions and greater traditional 
responsibility for prevention of serious crime, to engage in the 
burdensome and frequently futile efforts which are necessary 
· to predict the "correct" result in a particular case. 
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cc: The Conference 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Peter Byrne 
Re: No. 80-148, Robbins v. California 
Date: 06/18/81 
I have attempted to incorporate the substance of your 
riders, but often by expanding a section of text rather than by 
adding a new footnote. I 
Please see footnote ~ at -page~ • You had suggested 
that this be eliminated but, I think you misunderstood the 
thrust of the note. I have recast it to try to make it more 
clear. If someone lacks an expectation of privacy under Rakas, 
the Fourth Amendment is simply inapplicable. The footnote seems 
necessary to me to distinguish our inquiry so the same result 
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June 22, 1981 
RE: No. 81-48 Robbins v. California 
Dear Potter: 
I am having some "second thoughts" on my 
j 
concurring opinion in this case, but I will resolve 
them before Thursday's Conference. 
Justice Stewart 
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